

*Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.*, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000). We consider whether our reading of the criminal provision is absurd in light of the possible exception to civil liability for reasonable ignorance of the law. Sections 1320d-5 and 1320d-6 operate in a complementary fashion, covering mutually exclusive conduct. *See 42 U.S.C § 1320d-5(b)(1)* (excepting from civil penalties an act that "constitutes an offense punishable under *section 1320d-6 of this title.*").<sup>13</sup> The civil enforcement section provides, "A penalty may not be imposed . . . if . . . the person liable for the penalty did not know, and by exercising reasonable diligence would not have known, that such person violated the provision." *Id. § 1320d-5(b)(2)*. *Section 1320d-5* therefore may be read to premise civil liability on knowledge that the act in question violated the applicable standard, not just on knowledge that the particular act occurred.<sup>14</sup> If civil sanctions (of fines up to \$100) may be avoided by establishing reasonable ignorance of the law, it might at first blush appear to be an absurd result to conclude that the significantly more serious criminal punishments (of fines up to \$250,000 and imprisonment of up to ten years) may not be similarly excused. The absurd results canon of construction is "rarely invoke[d] . . . to override unambiguous legislation." *Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc.*, 534 U.S. 438, 459 (2002); *Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the canon is limited "to situations where the result of applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended the result, and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone."). Applying the usual definition of "knowingly" here does not yield an absurd result, and certainly not one so absurd that it would cause us to read the statute contrary to its plain meaning.

The argument that the statute should not be read so as to impose criminal punishment on the basis of a lesser degree of intent than that required for civil sanction would be more compelling if sections 1320d-5 and 1320d-6 covered the same acts. But they do not. *See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(b)(1)*. Civil sanctions may be imposed for violations of a wide variety of regulations. For these violations, the statute provides a maximum \$100 fine and sets forth certain exceptions to liability. *See id.* § 1320d-5 ("General penalty for failure to comply with requirements and standards").<sup>15</sup> In contrast, of all the possible violations of the regulations, section 1320d-6 carves out a limited set and subjects them to criminal punishment. Such punishment is reserved for violations involving "unique health identifiers" and "individually identifiable health information." *See id.* § 1320d-6 ("Wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information"). Thus, the statute reflects a heightened concern for violations that intrude upon the medical privacy of individuals. In light of this concern, there is nothing obviously absurd about the statute's allowing a defense of reasonable ignorance of the law for those regulatory violations subject to civil penalty, but withholding this defense with respect to those violations that threaten the privacy of individuals. Accordingly, even reading section 1320d-6 in light of section 1320d-5(b)'s exception to civil liability for reasonable ignorance of the law gives us no reason to doubt that the plain and ordinary meaning of the "knowingly" element of section 1320d-6 is the correct one. Nor is it proper to apply here the exception to the usual meaning of "knowingly" exemplified by *Liparota*. *See* 471 U.S. at 424-28. *Liparota* is the case cited by the Supreme Court in *Bryan* as an example of the exception to the rule—when "the text of the statute dictates a different result"—that "knowingly" refers to the facts that



grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act . . . .") (citation and quotation omitted). Moreover, our interpretation of "knowingly" does not dispense with the mens rea requirement of section 1320d-6 and create a strict liability offense; satisfaction of the "knowingly" element will still require proof that the defendant knew the facts that constitute the offense. *See Staples v. United States*, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n.3 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quotations and citations omitted) ("The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant's conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption, deeply rooted in the American legal system, that, ordinarily, ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution."). Finally, the concern expressed in Liparota about criminalizing a broad swath of seemingly innocent conduct is less present here. The statute in Liparota criminalized the unauthorized use of food stamps by any participant in the program, as well as by any person who might come in possession of these stamps. *See 471 U.S. at 426-27*. In contrast, section 1320d-6, as we conclude above, applies directly to covered entities. These covered entities—health plans, health care clearinghouses, certain health care providers, and Medicare prescription drug card sponsors—are likely well aware that the health care business they conduct is heavily regulated by HIPAA and other laws. To the extent that some concern remains, it is insufficient to override the plain meaning of the statute. Accordingly, Liparota provides no support for giving "knowingly" *in section 1320d-6* a meaning different from its usual understanding as referring only to knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

#### FRAUD UPON THE COURT STATUE

A judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully. State and federal attorneys fall into the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court. *People v. Zajic*, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).

Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". *In Bulloch v. United States*, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted."

"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." *Kenner v. C.I.R.*, 387 F.3d 689 (1968);

7 *Moore's Federal Practice*, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final." Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain circumstances. In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an



objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." *[Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).*

Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. *Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistreri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.")*.

That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." *Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972),* the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice."

The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", *Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954)*. A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.

"Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances."

***Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).***

Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." ***Balistrieri, at 1202.***

Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, and then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself. None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.

Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. ***United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996)*** ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").

Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this



manner, has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge). However some judges may not follow the law.

If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself.


However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances.

The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.

Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.

**WHEREFORE**, I pray that this court re-opens, allow jury trial, renders administers Criminal and Treble Civil penalties and further relief as is just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

  
Sandra A. Gresham Pro se Plaintiff

# Arms of Love



## GROCERY RELIEF PROGRAM

GROCERY CO-OP SERVICE LEARNING PROJECT



FILED

CLERK'S OFFICE  
DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT  
OF GEORGIA

REGINA THOMAS  
CLERK

BY: Jackie Dukes  
DEPUTY CLERK

October 31, 2013

### INTRODUCTION

My name is Sandra Gresham, and I am the President/CEO of Arms of Love Enterprises, Inc., an non-profit organization, established over 21 years ago to aid and assist victims of domestic violence after experiencing family violence as a child myself. I was born in the lineage of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the late Senator Arthur Langford, Jr., both are Civil Right Activist, and both are on my mother's side of the family, explaining why I advocate for others.

In 2007 I receive my new calling which is to address the needs of victims who fear Government Officials. I witnessed firsthand of why victims of domestic violence remain silent. I was born and raised in the South, in Atlanta, Georgia. Unfortunately, Georgia being listed as number one for Public Corruption in the nation, and that is because of the history of Corrupt Officials appointing people that lack integrity, little or no morals.

I am seeking the assistance of the Federal Government in Washington D.C., to aid and assist me with receiving the proper justice being sought, because as Dr. Martin Luther King stated "A threat to Justice anywhere is a threat to Justice everywhere". Chief Judge Steven Teske, who sits on the Georgia Judicial Council, is a Mole on the bench infiltrating the Judicial Circuit. Not to exclude former Commissioner Eldrin Bell, and ex Atlanta Chief of Police is known as a "Magnet for Corruption"; every top position that he has ever held always end with him being investigated for corruption and he always execute his 5th amendment right with "NO" consequence for his actions. All a top officials or wealthy celebrities have to do is lure family into Chief Judge Steven Teske jurisdiction, because Clayton County Georgia has a well Organized Enterprise called Clayton County Collaborative Authority in place that is guaranteed to pervert the course of justice Judicial Machinery and local Government. Please appoint one of your officials to Govern this process to discourage cover-up that is prevalent in Georgia.

Enclosing I am attaching my motions, and news clippings confirming just how troubled Georgia really is. I also have a dream that one day Georgia will be listed as # 50 for Public Corruption. This is a start!

Sincerely,

Sandra A. Gresham

President/CEO



**IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
BANKRUPTCY COURT**

**SANDRA GRESHAM**

**Pro se Plaintiff**

**Case: 13-62026**

OCT 31 2013 AM 11:35

**FILED**  
IN CLERK'S OFFICE  
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT  
OF GEORGIA

M. REGINA THOMAS  
CLERK

*Jackie Dukes*  
BY: \_\_\_\_\_  
DEPUTY CLERK

**MOTION TO EXPUNGE RECORDS, AND APPOINT TO THE ORGANIZED CRIME AND  
RACKETEERING SECTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
("OCRS") FOR PREPARATION AND ASSISTANCE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION**

COMES NOW, Sandra Gresham Pro se Plaintiff moves pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7) to Expunge the multiple fraudulent bankruptcy filings in my name. As I seek to re-establish Case No. 1:09-cv-1980 RICO as a Continuity and Racketeering case involving my son's Grandfather former Commissioner Eldrin Bell, of whom is currently under investigation for Public Corruption with a Grand Jury in Clayton County where he is executing his 5<sup>th</sup> amendment right. In Federal Court I will be adding Mr. Leonard Brown, Judge Philip Taylor and Judge Philip Taylor case 13-E-05590, and Judge David Darden 13-D-60 Co-Conspirators of Chief Judge Steven Teske's role to the Wheel and Spoke Conspiracy "Black Ball" when he Prejudiced me with the Judicial Circuit. Judge Steven Teske threatened me while on the bench with destruction and humiliation for reporting him to the Judicial Qualification, and the FBI. Judge Steven Teske Recused himself from the Clayton County fraudulent Case and Orders he signed and participated as a favor to his colleague, Board Member Eldrin Bell. Also, during his time as a Board member for the Clayton County Collaborative Authority during this time Steven Teske was serving with the Georgia Judicial Council 2007-2008. The Supreme Court has held that when a non-represented litigant appears and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified

him/herself. The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce. Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their civil and criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.

**WHEREAS**, Mr. Leonard Brown was aware that my Arms of Love Enterprises, Inc. business operated the Administrative office from the home of 317 Alderman Trace, Austell, Georgia 30168. Mr. Brown was the one that informed me about the multiple Bankruptcy filings, and the courts prejudice against me on the State level, he was aware that I was a victim of Identity Theft; and all of the fraudulent activities and still chose to participate with the Enterprise. After Mr. Brown filed for a Relief of Stay from this court, he willfully violated rule 4001 Relief of Stay, resulting in theft of donated monies from Sunday's fundraiser, broken furniture, and equipment. Monday, July 29, 2013 early a.m. eviction arranged by Mr. Brown's sister, whose name will be made available upon Racketeering Investigator's will investigate who orchestrated the bankruptcy filings upon Discoveries. Mr. Leonard Brown filed a motion on August 23, 2013 petitioning the Cobb State Court to deny request for Motion to Appeal after Cobb County Sheriff Department already executed an unlawful eviction. The Deputy Sheriff was provided with the Bankruptcy filing and Motion for Relief of Stay Hearing which was entered by Mr. Brown which was denied on September 12, 2013, instead followed the R.I.C.O. Conspiracy Order without notice. Mr. Brown acted on mens rea when he committed the offense of depriving me of the application of constitutional due process traditionally knowing that it divided into the two categories of Substantive Due Process and Procedural due process. These categories are derived from a distinction that is made between two types of law. Substantive Law creates, defines, and regulates rights, whereas



procedural law enforces those rights or seeks redress for their violation qualifying him for the Wheel and Spoke CONSPRACY.

**THEREFORE**, RICO statute expressly states that it is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the subsections of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962. The government need not prove that the defendant agreed with every other conspirator, knew all of the other conspirators, or had full knowledge of all the details of the conspiracy. **Delano, 825 F. Supp. at 542**. All that must be shown is: (1) that the defendant agreed to commit the substantive racketeering offense through agreeing to participate in two racketeering acts; (2) that he knew the general status of the conspiracy; and (3) that he knew the conspiracy extended beyond his individual role. **United States v. Rastelli, 870 F. 2d 822, 828 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982, 110 S. Ct. 515, 107 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1989)**.

A "wheel and spoke" conspiracy is where one person or entity, the "wheel" (also sometimes called the "hub" because all the activity revolves around that party), has different conspiratorial agreements with different people who have nothing to do with each other. In this case, the one common person is the wheel and each co-conspirator is a different spoke. See **Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)**.

Mr. Brown, being listed as a Co-Conspirator with my RICO case may or may not have the protection against double jeopardy considered which is "a universal Maxim of the common law" (**United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340, 95 S. Ct. 1013, 1020, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232 [1975]**) and was embraced by eminent jurists Henry de Bracton (1250), Sir Edward Coke (1628), Sir Matthew Hale (1736), and Sir William Blackstone (1769).

**WHEREFORE**, I pray that this court renders administers Jurisdictional Justice and further relief as is just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

  
Sandra A. Gresham Pro se Plaintiff

## Select a Case

There were 15 matching persons.

There were 18 matching cases.

Name	Case No.	Case Title	Chapter / Lead BK case	Date Filed	Party Role	Date Closed
Gresham, Sandra A (pty) (1 case)	<u>09-79683-mgd</u>	Sandra A Gresham	13 <i>I did not file</i>	07/30/09	Debtor	09/17/09
Gresham, Sandra A (pty) (1 case)	<u>09-93306-jem</u>	Earl Edward Hagger	13 <i>I did not file this is not me</i>	12/18/09	Petition Preparer	02/17/10
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty) (1 case)	<u>07-66829-mgd</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham	13 <i>I did not file</i>	04/30/07	Debtor	01/23/08
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty) (1 case)	<u>05-95230-mhm</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham	13 <i>I did not file</i>	08/15/05	Debtor	11/14/05
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty) (1 case)	<u>09-73293-mgd</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham	13 <i>I did not file</i>	05/26/09	Debtor	09/17/09
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty) (1 case)	<u>05-93383-mgd</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham	13 <i>I did not file</i>	05/19/05	Debtor	08/17/05
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty) (1 case)	<u>05-90788-mgd</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham	13 <i>I did not file</i>	02/03/05	Debtor	05/05/05
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty)	<u>09-85096-jem</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham	13 <i>I did not file</i>	09/25/09	Debtor	10/29/09



(2 cases)

	<u>09-88016-mgd</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham and Sandra Anne Gresham	13 <i>I did not file</i>	10/23/09	Debtor	12/15/09
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty) (1 case)	<u>13-62026-mhm</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham	✓ 7 <i>I did file</i>	06/03/13	Debtor	N / A
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty) (1 case)	<u>09-88016-mgd</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham and Sandra Anne Gresham	13 <i>I did not file</i>	10/23/09	Debtor	12/15/09
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty) (2 cases)	<u>09-88016-mgd</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham and Sandra Anne Gresham	13 <i>I did not file</i>	10/23/09	Debtor	12/15/09
	<u>10-60667-mgd</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham and Sandra Anne Gresham	7 <i>I did not file</i>	01/07/10	Debtor	09/01/10
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty) (2 cases)	<u>13-59615-mhm</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham ✓	13 <i>I did file</i>	05/02/13	Debtor	07/03/13
	<u>13-60309-jrs</u>	Jasmine Desiree' Batten ✓	13 <i>I assisted</i>	05/08/13	Petition Preparer	06/10/13
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty) (1 case)	<u>10-60667-mgd</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham and Sandra Anne Gresham ✓	7 <i>I did not file</i>	01/07/10	Debtor	09/01/10
Gresham, Sandra Anne (pty) (1 case)	<u>10-60667-mgd</u>	Sandra Anne Gresham and Sandra Anne Gresham	7 <i>I did not file</i>	01/07/10	Debtor	09/01/10
Gresham, Sandra G (pty) (1 case)	<u>88-09770-jb</u>	Quinn L. Gresham Sandra G. Gresham	13 <i>I did not file</i>	11/10/88	Debtor	03/16/89

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
ATLANTA DIVISION**

IN RE:

Sandra GreshamCase No.: 13-62026Judge: MurphyChapter: 7

Debtor(s).

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, the undersigned, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that I am, and at all times hereinafter mentioned, was more than 18 years of age, and that on the 31 day of October 2013, I served a copy of motion to Amend Expenditure, which was filed in this bankruptcy matter on the 10th day of Sept, 2013.

Mode of service (circle one):

MAIL ☐HAND DELIVER ☐

Name and Address of each party served:

**I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.**Dated: 31 Oct 13

Signature:

Sandra A. Gresham

Printed Name:

Sandra A. Gresham

Address:

317 Alderman Trace  
Lawrenceville, GA 30046

Phone:

(404) 437-0940



**CERTIFICATED OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I have this day mailed through the United States Postal Service  
and/or via email a copy of this motion to the following, to wit:

U.S. Department of Justice <b>Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General</b> 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001	FBI Headquarters, <b>James B. Comey Director</b> 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20535-0001
The United States Attorney's Office Richard B. Russell Federal Building <b>Sally Yates, U.S. Attorney General</b> 75 Spring Street, S.W. Suite 600 Atlanta, GA 30303-3309	FBI Atlanta, <b>Mark Giuliano, Special Agent</b> 2635 Century Parkway, N.E., Suite 400 Atlanta, GA 30345
Office of the Attorney General <b>Sam Olen, Attorney General</b> C/O SAAG Judy Holdaway SAAG Carol Lawing Public Defender Linda Day Public Defender Deborah Leslie Public Defender Evan Black Public Defender Ernest Crosby 40 Capitol Square, SW Atlanta, Ga 30334	Clayton County Collaborative Authority <b>John Brinson, Executive Authority</b> 696 Mt. Zion Rd. Jonesboro, GA 30236-1562  <b>Leonard Brown</b> 59 Bird St Gahanna, Ohio 43230.
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services <b>Secretary Kathleen Sebelius</b> 200 Independence Ave., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20201	Hearts to Nourish Hope <b>Deborah Swank</b> 345 Scott Rd Riverdale, GA 30296
U.S. Department of Health & Human Service <b>Paul Dioguardi, Director of</b> <b>Intergovernmental and External Affairs</b> Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center (SNAFC) 61 Forsyth Street, SW Atlanta, GA 30303-8909	<b>Chief Judge Deborah C. Benefield,</b> Judge Steven Teske, Juvenile Court K. Van Banke, Juvenile Court Harold R. Banke Justice Center - Room 4JC202 9151 Tara Boulevard, Jonesboro, GA 30236
U.S. Department of Health & Human Service <b>Pamela Roshell, PhD, MS, Director</b> Cathy Ratti Cindy Wheeler Nicole Bass Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, Room 5B95 Atlanta, GA 30303-8909	Clayton County District Attorney <b>Tracy Graham Lawson</b> 9151 Tara Blvd Jonesboro, GA 30236 Cobb County District Attorney Vic Reynolds 70 Haynes St Marietta, GA 30090

This ~~30~~<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2013

Sandra Gresham

  
Pro se Plaintiff